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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION

District Court Jurisdiction
The Third Judicial District Court had original jurisdiction as the trial court in this
criminal matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).

Court of Appeals Jurisdiction
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over the present case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). Grounds for the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction are that this is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and a judgment and
conviction for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103(1)(b)&(3). The matter was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 20,
1998. R. 444. The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

Order on Appeal
This is an appeal from the final Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) issued on
December 8, 1997, by the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Sandra Peuler,
Judge, presiding. R. 435-37
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
Issue of Argument I:
Whether there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr.
Mecham, or another party to the offense, "took personal property in the
possession of the Million Dollar Saloon from the person or immediate presence
of the manager" as charged in the information and stated in the jury instructions.
The issue was preserved by a timely motion. R. 462 (p. 4, I. 5 - p. 5, I. 20;
p. 79, I. 20 - p. 80, I. 1; p. 86 I. 17 - p. 87, I. 6).
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether based on
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury, the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
Additionally, this issue should be reviewed for manifest injustice and plain
error. "Manifest injustice" occurs where "exceptional circumstances" or "plain
error" exist. See State v. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam); State
v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). The standard of review is whether,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
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Issue of Argument II:
Whether the affidavit for the search warrant for the search of the
Chevrolet Blazer wholly lacked indicia of probable cause and was so
facially deficient that the evidence seized should have been suppressed
at trial.
The issue was preserved by a timely motion prior to trial and
objection at trial. R. 186-203, 231-236, R. 458 (p. 4, I. 20 - p. 5, .I 17).
The standard for review for the trial court's admission of evidence is under
the correctness standard, whether the trial court's ruling on the admission
of evidence is correct as a matter of law. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774,
781 n.3 (Utah 1991).

Issue of Argument III:
Whether the affiant for the search warrant intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly omitted information, and, with the omitted information inserted, the
affidavit does not support probable cause.
This issue should be reviewed for manifest injustice and plain error.
"Manifest injustice" occurs where "exceptional circumstances" or "plain
error" exist. See, State v. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per
curiam); State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). The standard of
review is whether, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
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more favorable outcome for the appellant. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993).

issue of Argument IV.
Wao Sergeant Julian's testimony to the jury, which was merely opinion
and for which he had no actual personal knowledge, that Jeffrey Mecham was in
the parking lot and shooting at the time of the offense reversible error?
The issue was preserved by a timely objection and motion at trial.
R. 186-203, 231-236, R. 458 (p. 4, I. 20 - p. 5, .I 17)(Addendum B,
Preservation of the Issue Regarding Argument IV).
The standard for review for the trial court's admission of evidence is under
the correctness standard, whether the trial court's ruling on the adr ission of
evidence is correct as a matter of law. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3
(Utah 1991).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES RULES
AND REGULATIONS REQUIRING INTERPRETATION IN THIS APPEAL

Federal Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
State Constitutional Provisions
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 14
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203
Rule
U.R.E. 602
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal as of right of appellant's criminal convictions as the defendant
is the Third Judicial District Court on two felony counts, one a first degree felony,
Aggravated Robbery, and one a third degree felony, Aggravated Assault. See, R. 43537.

Course of Proceedings
Mr. Mecham was charged by Information with one count of Aggravated Robbery
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; two counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide,
Aggravated Murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995); and four counts
of Aggravated Kidnaping in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995). R. 10-13.
An arrest warrant was issued. Mr. Mecham pleaded not guilty and the case was bound
over for a jury trial. R.19.
On September 27, 1997, Ben Forbes signed an affidavit for a search warrant. R.
195-197. (Addendum B, Affidavit for Search Warrant). On that same day, the
magistrate for the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, issued the Search
Warrant. R. 199-200. (Addendum B, Search Warrant). On March 31, 1997, the
Defendant filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized together with a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized. R. 173203. (Addendum B, Motion to Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized, Memorandum in
6

Support of Motion to Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized). The motion to suppress the
evidence was denied. R. 231-236. (Addendum B, Minute Entry).
A jury trial was held on October 7-10, and 14, 1997, in the present matter before
the Honorable Sandra Peuier, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah. R. 458-462. During the trial, the court dismissed the four charges of aggravated
kidnaping and one count of Attempted Criminal Homicide against Mr. Mecham. R. 462
(p. 78, 8^-86). The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Mr. Mecham for Aggravated
Robbery and Aggravated Assault. R. 375, 377. The defendant was sentenced on
December 8, 1997. 435-437.
Mr. Mecham filed a Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court on December
30, 1997. R. 438. The case was poured over to the Court of Appeals March 20, 1998.
R. 444. Pursuant to the stipulated motion extending the time, the Appellant's Opening
Brief is due and to be submitted on September 21, 1998. Mr. Mecham appeals his
convictions for Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Assault.

Disposition in the District Court
On October 14, 1997, the appellant, Mr. Mecham, was convicted by a jury of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1 )(b)&(3).
R. 375, 377. On December 8, 1997, Mr. Mecham was sentenced to serve a term of not
less than five years to life for the Aggravated Robbery and a term of zero to five years
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for the Aggravated Assault the two terms of imprisonment running consecutively.
Judgement. Sentence (Commitments R. 435-37 (dated Dec. 8, 1997)(Addemdum B).

Statement of Relevant Facts
In the early morning hours of September 24, 1995, two men disguised as clowns
in masks and baggy outfits and entered the Million Dollar Saloon at 3420 South State
Street. R. 458 (pp. 188, 209). The Saloon had already closed when the individuals
dressed as clowns entered through a side entrance commonly used by employees after
hours. R. 458 (p. 188); R. 459 (p. 19). The individuals who entered were described as
"clowns" and were passing out roses. R. 458 (p. 188). Walter "Tex" Finley ("Tex"), the
saloon's bouncer, asked the clowns to leave. R. 458 (p. 188,230). The clowns
disregarded the request and passed out roses to the patrons and employees in the
saloon. R. 459 (p. 50). Suspecting that a robbery was about to occur, two employees
slipped into a back room unnoticed and called 911. R. 458 (p. 189,195).
Meanwhile, Tex and Christopher Mr. Stanley ("Mr. Stanley"), the Saloon
manager, attempted to physically lead the clowns out of the building. R. 459 (p. 50).
The clowns walked a few steps toward the door as if to comply. ]aL Suddenly, one
clown, who apparently was Mr. Hollen, turned and pulled a gun on Mr. Stanley and Tex,
while the other clown held the other patrons and employees at gunpoint. R. 459 (p. 5051).
Mr. Hollen asked who was in charge. R. 459 (p. 56). Mr. Stanley identified
himself as the manager, i d , Mr. Hollen ordered Mr. Stanley to take him to where the
8

money was kept and gave Mr. Stanley a large bag. R. 459 (p. 61). Mr. Stanley led Mr.
Hollen into a back room containing the company safes, id. At gunpoint, Mr. Hollen
ordered Mr. Stanley to open the safes and place the money into the bag held by Mr.
Stanley, R. 459 (p. 60-61). Mr. Stanley placed approximately three thousand dollars in
paper money in the bag. R. 459 (p. 62).
Meanwhile, the phone rang. R. 459 (p. 63). Mr. Hollen told Mr. Stanley to
answer after several rings. R. 459 (p. 63-64). A 911 operator on the other end
informed Mr. Stanley that an officer was outside the Saloon and instructed him to open
the west door. R. 459 (p. 64). Mr. Stanley said that he could not do that and hung up.
R. 459 (p. 64-65). Mr. Stanley informed Mr. Hollen that officers had arrived and were
waiting outsiae. R. 459 (p. 65). At that point, Mr. Hollen appeared to panic and left the
room. R. 459 (p. 65). Mr. Hollen never touched the bag with the money, lying on the
floor in the safe room. R. 459 (p. 61-65). When the detectives located the bag and its
contents, it was still in the office of the Million Dollar Saloon where the manager had left
it. R. 461 (p. 132).
Sergeant Julian, a Deputy Sheriff for the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, was
the initial officer responding to the 911 call regarding the robbery of the Million Dollar
Saloon on September 24, 1997. R. 459 (p. 87-89). At the time he testified, he stated
he had been with the Sheriffs Office eighteen and a half years. R. 459 (p. 88). While
investigating the call, he was hailed to a door where someone in a clown mask
confronted him with a gun. R. 459 (p. 97-98). Upon seeing the gun, Sergeant Julian
ran, and while pulling out his weapon was shot in the arm. R. 459 (p. 99). Sergeant
9

Julian returned fire then saw someone come out and run along the side of the Million
Dollar Saloon, heading west. R. 459 (p. 105-106). Shortly thereafter, another
individual appeared at the door and started to shoot in Sergeant Julian's direction. R.
459 (p. 106). Eventually, Sergeant Julian believed he hit this second individual, after
which both the individual and Sergeant Julian made their way across the parking lot of
the Million Dollar Saloon in a northwesterly direction. R. 459 (p. 108-109). Sergeant
Julian made his way to the driveway of the Million Dollar Saloon, at which time he saw
both of the individuals. The individual that had gone west was prone over the hood of
Sergeant Julian's patrol car. R. 459 (p. 110). Sergeant Julian located the other
individual by a vehicle at the northwest end of some parking stalls on the ground having
been shot. R. 459 (p. 113-114, 117); who Sergeant Julian was able to identify at trial
as Mr. Hollen. R. 459 (p. 123).
Sergeant Julian never testified that from his personal knowledge he could
identify Mr. Mecham as the second individual; and, on cross-examination admitted that
he never saw the second individual's face. R. 459 (p. 160). Even so, on two occasions
during trial Sergeant Julian stated to the jury that Mr. Mecham was the other individual,
once when he said, "Mr. Mecham was shooting" and again when he said, "my attention
went to Mr. Mecham." R. 459 (p. 133, 140).
Mr. Hollen, the second clown, and several officers, who subsequently arrived on
the scene, became embroiled in a gunfight outside the Saloon. R. 459 (p. 98-120).
The other clown escaped over a fence. R. 459 (p. 115). Mr. Hollen was shot in the
knee and apprehended at the scene in the parking lot. R. 459 (p. 169), 460 (p. 52). Mr.
10

Mecham was found in a dumpster and was charged as a codefendant. R. 459 (p. 123);
R. 460 (p. 143).
Three days after the robber, on September 27, 1997, an affidavit for a search
warrant for the Chevrolet Biazer, and another vehicle, was sworn out. R. 195-197.
With regard to the Chevrolet Blazer, the affidavit describes the vehicle as follows:
Vehicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white over blue over white,
License #122 HCH, Utah, VIN #1G8EK18C9EF114050.

isL
Additionally, the affidavits states,
"A search of the surrounding area located the described vehicles in the
area of the business."
id.
At trial Mr. Mecham requested and received a continuing objection regarding the
evidence seized from the Blazer. R. 458 (p. 4-5). The State introduced evidence that
the Blazer was registered to Jeffrey Mecham. R. 461 (p. 106). Then, the State
introduced the contents of a bag seized from the Blazer. R. 461 (p. 126). The
evidence included: flower wrapping, R. 461 (p. 141); a wallet found in a door
compartment of the passenger's side of the Blazer that contained a driver's license for
Philip Earl Hollen, R. 458 (p. 141-142), and a visitor card for the Million Dollar Saloon.
R. 458 (p. 143); and a wallet containing Mr. Mecham's driver's license that was in the
driver's compartment on the door. R. 458 (p. 142).
The officer who signed the affidavit for the search warrant (R. 195-197) also
testified at trial that he was the lead investigating officer in the case R. 195-197, R. 461
(p. 161). He testified he had the job of reviewing all law enforcement reports regarding
11

the case, to analyses whether all of the officers who were at the scene appropriately
filed reports, and to collect the evidence. R. 461 (p. 163). He testified at trial that the
vehicle had been moved, and that the search of the vehicle was not conducted at the
location where it was originally found and that no law enforcement reports or logs were
prepared at all regarding when the vehicle was moved or how the vehicle got to the
place it as searched. R. 461 (p. 179-181).
Pursuant to Utah's aggravated robbery statute, the State charged that Mr. Hollen
"took personal property in the possession of Million Dollar Saloon." R. 9; (Addendum B,
Information). The jury was similarly instructed that it had to find that Mr. Hollen "took
personal property then in the possession of the Million Dollar Saloon." R. 404;
(Addendum B, Jury Instruction). The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Mr.
Mecham for Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Assault. R. 375, 377.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Summary of Argument I
There was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. Mecham, or another
party to the offense, "took personal property in the possession of the million dollar
saloon from the person or immediate presence of the manager" as charged in the
information and stated in the jury instructions. In the instant case, the State did not
charge Mr. Mecham with attempting to take property, and did not to include the
"attempts to take" or similar language in the charge as set forth in Count I in the
Information. The jury was similarly charged that they could find Mr. Mecham guilty of
aggravated robbery only if the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Mecham "took personal property then in the possession of the Million Dollar Saloon,
from the person or immediate presence of Christopher Stanley." At no point during the
trial did the State move to amend the information to include language regarding an
attempt under the Aggravated Robbery Statute. No evidence was introduced at trial
that there was the requisite taking. Therefore, the Aggravated Robbery conviction is
not supported by the evidence presented at trial.

Summary of Argument II
The affidavit for the search warrant for the search of the Chevrolet Blazer wholly
lacked indicia of probable cause and was so facially deficient that the evidence seized
should have been suppressed at trial. Other than describing the vehicle, the only fact
13

alleged in the affidavit was that "[a] search of the surrounding area located the
described vehicles in the area of the business." This fact is not sufficient for there to be
a finding of probable cause for th issuance of a search warrant. A warrant based on
an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable should bp suppressed, and the good faith exception for
t\ a officer conducting the search does not apply. The court should reverse the
convictions, as the evidence seized during the search should have been excluded at
trial.

Summary of Argument III
The affiant for the search warrant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly omitted
information, and, with the omitted information inserted, t^e affidavit does no. support
probable cause. In the present case, the omitted facts include: (1) certain unknown law
enforcement officers and persons moved the vehicle, and neither the location the
vehicle was originally found nor the location to which the vehicle was moved were
disclosed to the magistrate in the affidavit for the search warrant; (2) certain unknown
law enforcement officers and persons had access to and opportunity to enter into the
vehicle to be searched without acquiring a warrant; and the inherent problem that arises
because (3) no reports or records were made by or regarding the unknown law
enforcement officers and persons who had opportunity to or who entered into and in
fact moved the vehicle that was subject of the search. Misstatements which occur
because material information has been knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly omitted
14

from an affidavit for a search warrant are grounds for finding the affidavit is not
supported when the missing facts are considered. In the present case, known facts
have been omitted and because no law enforcement reports regarding the facts exist,
none may be inserted. The court should reverse the convictions, as the evidence
seized during the search should have been excluded at trial.

Summary of Argument IV
Sergeant Julian's testimony to the jury, which was merely opinion and for which
he had no actual personal knowledge, that Jeffrey Mecham was in the parking lot and
shooting at the time of the offense was error per se.

Sergeant Julian never testified

from his personal knowledge he could identify Mr. Mecham as the second individual. In
fact, he testified on cross-examination that he never saw the second individual's face.
On two occasions Sergeant Julian made inappropriate statements during testimony,
stating that Mr. Mecham was the other individual, once when he said, "Mr. Mecham was
shooting." and again when he said, "my attention went to Mr. Mecham." Sergeant
Julian invaded the province of the jury by taking over the fact finding duties of the jury,
and stating the conclusion he desired them to reach, telling the jury Mr. Mecham was
guilty. This abdication of the jury process is a violation of Due Process and Mr.
Mecham's right to have guilt determined by a jury. This error requires that Mr.
Mecham's convictions in the present case be reversed.

15

ARGUMENT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND
THAT MR. MECHAM, OR ANOTHER PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, "TOOK
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE MILLION
DOLLAR SALOON FROM THE PERSON OR IMMEDIATE PRESENCE
OF THE MANAGER" AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND
STATED IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
The State failed to establish that Mr. Mecham, or another party to the offense,
"took personal property in the possession of the Million Dollar Saloon from the person
or immediate presence of the manager" and, hence, the conviction for aggravated
robbery fails for insufficient evidence.
Mr. Mecham was charged with Aggravated Robbery, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). R. 9. Utah's Aggravated Robbery statute proscribes the
conduct of one who "unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, by means of force or fear," Utah Code Ann. 76-6-301 (Robbery)(Supp. 1998),
and who "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" in the commission of the
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Aggravated Robbery).
In the instant case, the State did not charge Mr. Mecham with attempting to take
property, and did not to include the "attempts to take" or similar language in the charge
as set forth in Count I in the Information. R.9. Consequently, the information read in
pertinent part as follows:
Count I - Aggravated Robbery . . . Jeffrey Devon Mecham and Philip Earl Hollen,
as parties to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of the Million Dollar Saloon from the person or immediate
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presence of the manager of Million Dollar Saloon, and in the course of
committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon.
R. 9; (Addendum B, Information). The jury was similarly charged in Instruction No. 18
that they could find Mr. Mecham guilty of aggravated robbery only if the State
established beyond a reasonable doubt that: "JEFFREY DEVON MECHAM, as a party
to the offense, took personal property then in the possession of the Million Dollar
Sa.oon, from the person or immediate presence of Christopher Stanley." R. 404;
(Addendum B, Jury Instruction No. 18).
At no point during the trial did the State move to amend the information to
include language regarding an attempt under the Aggravated Robbery Statute.1 See
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) (1998) (court may permit information to be amended before
verdict if a different or additional offense is not charged and substantial rights of
a 3used are not affected, after verdict if amendment will bar subsequent prosecution for
same offense on same facts). The State failed to make the appropriate motion and it
was bound to prosecute its case as charged in the information. Moreover, Hollen's
conviction on appeal must be assessed in light of the charge as set forth in the
information and the evidence proffered by the State in support thereof.2

1

The State did move to amend the Information with regard
to the Aggravated Kidnaping charges of Counts IV, V, VI, and VII.
R. 379, 462[75-77]. However, the State did not move to amend the
Aggravated Robberv Charge. It follows that the State reviewed
the Information after the evidence and testimony were presented
at trial and intended to proceed with its Aggravated Robbery as
set forth in Count I as originally charged.
2

To proceed otherwise would violate Mr. Mecham1s right
under the State and Federal Constitutions to be apprised of the
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In light of the foregoing, the Aggravated Robbery conviction, as charged in the
information and provided for in the jury instructions, is not supported by the evidence
presented at trial. Specifically, the State failed to show that Mr. Mecham, or even Mr.
Hollen, the codefendant, "took" the money in the bag from Stanley. Neither of the
"Clowns" in the Million Dollar Saloon ever touched the bag, let alone carried it any
distance or remove it from the presence of the manager or the premises of the Saloon.
The evidence establishes only that Mr. Hollen forced Mr. Stanley at gunpoint into a
back room of the Saloon where the safes were kept. R.459 (61); that Mr. Hollen handed
Mr. Stanley a black gym-type bag, id.; that Mr. Stanley opened a safe and filled the bag
with approximately three thousand dollars, R.459 (62); that the police arrived while Mr.

charges against him. See Utah Const. Article I, § 12 ("accused
shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof"); Article
I, § 13 (" [o]ffenses . . . shall be prosecuted by information");
U.S. Const, amend. VI ("accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"); see also
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a) ("all offenses shall be prosecuted by
information"). In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 12 to mean
"that the accused [must] be given sufficient information ! so
that he can know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct
and can adequately prepare his defense. 1 " Id. at 1214 (citation
omitted). If the State is not bound by the charge as stated in
the information, and appellate review is not conducted within
those parameters as well, then Mr. Mecham will effectively be
denied his right to present an adequate defense.
Moreover, Mr. Mecham 1 s due process rights would be abridged
if the State is not bound by the information as charged. See
Utah Const. Art. I. § 7 ("[nlo person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law"); U.S. Const,
amend. XIV ("[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law"). If the State
had brought such a motion in a timely manner before the trial
court, during or prior to the trial, Mr. Mecham would have had
the opportunity to defend himself.
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Stanley was placing the money in the bag, prompting Mr. Hollen to exit the Saloon
without picking up the bag or ever touching it during the course of these events, R.459
(63-65). Moreover, the bag and its contents were later found by detectives lying on the
floor of the safe room of the Miiiion Doiiar Saloon, where Mr. Stanley had left it. R.461
(132).
All this evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
fail to establish that Mr. Hollen or a co-participant "took" the money from Stanley. No
evidence directly or through inference shows that the during the offense any wrongdoer
"took personal property in the possession of [the] Million Dollar Saloon from the person
or immediate presence of the manager [Mr. Stanley]." The State failed to establish one
of the elements of the charge as set forth in the information and the elements of the jury
charge, and the conviction should not stand.
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed other cases where the State has failed to
support an element of the offense charged with sufficient evidence. In State v. Petree.
659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the defendant was convicted in a jury trial of second degree
murder of a fifteen year old girl. \± The defendant appealed, arguing the evidence was
not sufficient for the jury to convict him of the crime of second degree murder for
"intentionally or knowingly" causing the death of the girl. \± at 444. The Petree court
applied Utah's standard for sufficiency of the evidence, and reviewed "the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury." i i The court noted that the State's evidence primarily pointed to a
strange dream that the defendant had related to others. idL at 447. The Court found
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that the evidence failed to establish Mr. Petree murdered the girl, and manifestly failed
to prove he did so "knowingly and intelligently." \± at 447. In reversing the murder
conviction, the Petree Court stated:
[We] deem it desirable to emphasize that notwithstanding the
presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court still has the right to
review the to support the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the
defendant must cover the gap between the presumption of innocence and
the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State in re J.S.H., Utah,
642 P.2d 386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas. Utah, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240
(1980).
Petree. 659 P.2d at 444-45.
In the present case the evidentiary fabric cannot be stretched to the point it
shows any money was taken and the conviction for Aggravated Robbery should fall.
The evidence shows the manager placed the money in the bag. R. 459 (p. 62,1. 2-25).
The Sheriffs department called, causing the individual with the manager to panic and
leave the room. R. 459 (p. 65, I. 20-23). When the detectives located the bag and its
contents, it was still in the office of the Million Dollar Saloon where the manager had left
it. R. 461 (p. 132,1. 4-19). Based on the analysis of Petree. the court should reverse
the Aggravated Robbery conviction in present case.
In State v. Franks. 649 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court reversed an
automobile theft conviction, id, at 4. During trial, the evidence was essentially that the
defendant was stopped driving a car, the car was searched and a registration was
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found. The officer contacted the individuals indicted on the registration and the vehicle
was returned to them, k l At the close of the state's case, defendant moved for
dismissal of all the charges in the information on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to submit the case to the jury. \± The motion was denied and the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of theft as charged. JdL

The Supreme Court reversed the

conviction in Franks, holding that the evidence supporting the theft charge was de
minimums.
In the present case, the jury had no evidence or testimony that any money was
taken and "must have entertained a reasonable doubt" as to Mr. Mecham's guilt for
Aggravated Robber as charged in the information. Given that the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom do not establish that Mr. Mecham, or Mr. Hollen for
that matter, ever touched the bag containing the money, let alone transported it from
the premises of the Saloon. The State did not amend the information to reflect the
"attempt" language of the aggravated robbery statute, and the jury was instructed in
accordance with the State's discrete theory that Mr. Mecham was guilty of Aggravated
Robbery in that he "took" the money. The State could not meet its burden of proof at
trial because it did not present any evidence at all regarding an essential element of the
crime charge. Accordingly, Mr. Mecham's Aggravated Robbery conviction fails for
insufficient evidence and should be reversed.

ARGUMENT II
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THE AFFIDAVIT FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE SEARCH OF
THE CHEVROLET BLAZER WHOLLY LACKED INDICIA OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AND WAS SO FACIALLY DEFICIENT THAT THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AT TRIAL
The affidavit for the search warrant of the Chevrolet Blazer was wr illy
^adequate on its face, and the evidence seized from the vehicle and ad~ lifted at trial
->nould have Seen suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Art. I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Under Utah Law, a magistrate
may only issue a search warrant upon a finding of probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203(1). In the present case, the affidavit in
support of the search warrant was so lacking in factual information that it lacked
probable cause.
The Million Dollar Saloon was robbed during the early morning hours of
September 24, 1997. R. 461 (p. 183,1. 2 3 - p . 182, I. 11; p. 186, I. 10-16; p. 187, I. 20 p. 188,1. 14). Three days later, on September 27, 1997, an affidavit for a search
warrant for the Chevrolet Blazer, and another vehicle, was sworn out. R. 195 -197.
(Addendum B, Affidavit for Search Warrant).
The affidavit is so defective on its face, that the magistrate could not have found
probable cause fcr the search of the Blazer. With regard to the Chevrolet Blazer, the
affidavit describes the vehicle as follows:
Vehicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white over blue over white,
License #122 HCH, Utah, VIN #1G8EK18C9EF114050.
JcL
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With respect to this Blazer, the only fact alleged in the affidavit that in any relates the
Blazer to the Million Dollar Saloon is the following
A search of the surrounding area located the described vehicles in the
area of the business.

Id*
Probable cause to search a vehicle does not exist based on the fact that that the
vehicle is in the area of a business that was robbed. The affidavit lacks any nexus
between the vehicle and the offense, nothing about the location, characteristics or time
frame regarding the robbery and the vehicle establish a connection in the affidavit that
would warrant a search.
Nothing in the affidavit connects how the location of the vehicle in relationship
with the business would warrant a search. The affidavit is silent regarding how broad
an area was searched, the magistrate issuing the affidavit could not determine whether
the area being discussed was merely the parking lot of the business, a city block, a
county wide or state wide search or otherwise - the term "area" is without limited
measure or dimension. The affidavit does not indicate that the specific location of the
vehicle was in any way unusual or peculiar, such that it would draw the attention of law
enforcement. The affidavit is silent as to whether the vehicle was located under a
camouflage or via duct, or in some other manner indicative of suspicious activity or
criminal conduct.
Nothing in the affidavit indicates there was something unusual about the vehicle,
the affidavit does not relate any characteristics of the vehicle that would distinguish it
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from any other vehicle in a manner that would call law enforcement to focus upon it for
evidentiary purposes. The affidavit does not state that any evidence was observed in
the vehicle. The affidavit does not state that the vehicle was owned by or registered to
anyone, much less that it may have belonged to any of the suspects. The affidavit does
not state any witness observed a suspect driving the vehicle, nor does it state that a
suspect acknowledged driving, owning or using the vehicle.
Nothing in the affidavit indicates temporal proximity between the vehicle and the
offense, the affidavit does not say that there is any connection between the time of the
offense and the vehicle. The magistrate, looking at the affidavit, does not know when
the search occurred. Note that the affidavit was signed three days after the date of the
offense. There is no way the magistrate would know whether the vehicle was found
within minutes, hours or days of the offense.
A court may not issue a search warrant unless the magistrate signing the warrant
has a substantial basis to conclude that in the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit
adequately establishes probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. State v.
Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). Utah applies the totality-of-the-circumstances
test articulated in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983); State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994). Affidavits used to
obtain a search warrant are to be construed in a common sense, reasonable manner.
State v. Williamson. 674 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1983).
Under this totality-of-the circumstances approach, the court is to determine
whether probable cause exists that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
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place by making a practical common-sense decision, given all of the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of the knowledge of the persons
supplying the hearsay information. Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332; Vigh.
871 P.2dat1033.
Courts, reviewing the probable cause determination of the magistrate, determine
if from the affidavit for a search warrant there were enough facts for concluding
probable cause existed. Vigh. 871 P.2d at 1033, State v. Coliard. 810 P.2d 884, 885
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The review is conducted by
viewing the affidavit in its entirety. Vigh. 871 P.2d at 1033; State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); see also. State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, cert, denied. 860
P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1993).
The law provides that evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith,
objectively and reasonably relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate need not be excluded at trial, even if the warrant is subsequently
invalidated by a lack of probable cause. State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 711, (Utah
App.) cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1993). However, there are four
circumstances where the good faith exception does not apply. \± The four
circumstances are:
(1)

the issuing magistrate is mislead by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard of the truth;

(2)

the issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to
perform his neutral and detached function;
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(3)

the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and

(4)

the warrant is so facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to
be searched or the things to be seized, that the executing officer cannot
presume it to be valid.

United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 922, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420, 3421, 82 LEd.2d
677(1984).
In the present case, upon the court's review of the affidavit for the required
minimal sufficiency, it should find that the affidavit is inadequate as a matter of law.
The affidavit lacks the necessary minimum indicia of probable cause, the search
warrant should not have issued, "the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." R. 191. As pointed out in the court below, the affidavit does not
indicate the vehicle was in any manner associated with, tied to, owned by, registered to
or otherwise connected with the crime or any suspect. R. 191. The affidavit does not
indicate the scope of the surrounding area, and the mere presence of a vehicle near a
crime scene is not sufficient to tie the vehicle to the crime or persons suspected to have
committed the crime. R. 192. The affidavit does not indicate that anything in, on or
about the vehicle, from a plain view or otherwise, connected it with the crime or any
suspect. idL The affidavit does not indicate the time of the initial or following
observations of the vehicle by law enforcement or any other person which would
provide any temporal proximity, association or connection to the crime or any suspect.
icL While the affidavit states the suspects attempted to flee, nothing in the affidavit
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indicates the vehicle was in any way associated with, part of, or involved with any
aspect of the attempt to flea. Id, The evidence found in the Blazer should have been
suppressed.
Prior to trial, based on the information provided through discovery, Mr. Mecham
raised the issue that the affidavit for the search warrant of the Chevrolet Blazer failed to
allege sufficient facts from which the magistrate issuing the warrant could conclude
probabie cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. R. 186-203. The
defendant's written motion raised the third and fourth circumstances under Leon, supra,
3 grounds for suppression of the evidence found in the vehicle. The district court
uenied the defendant's motion. R. 231-236.
The issue regarding the search warrant was further raised at trial by Mr.
Mecham's continuing objection. R. 458 (p. 4, I. 20 - p.5, I. 17). The evidence seized
during the seaich of the vehicle was introduced at trial over Mr. Mecham's continuing
objection. R. 461(p. 125, 20 - p. 130, I. 24; p. 141, I. 1 - p. 143, I. 20). Mr. Mecham's
conviction for both Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Assault should be reversed,
as the illegally obtained evidence from the Blazer that was introduced at trial was highly
prejudicial to Mr. Mecham.
Mr. Mecham was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence acquired during
the illegal search of the Blazer. At trial the State introduced into evidence that the
Blazer was registered to Jeffrey Mecham. R. 461 (p. 106,1. 9-17). Then, over the
continuing objection granted by the trial court, the State introduced the contents of a
bag seized from the Blazer. R. 461 (p. 126,1. 1-13). Specifically, the State introduced
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some flower wrapping obtained from the illegal search of the Blazer. R. 461 (p. 141,1.
3-10). The flower wrapping was prejudicial because the robbers, dressed as clowns,
passed out flowers. R. 458 (p. 188,1. 11-14 "people dressed as clowns"; p. 188, I. 2224 "handing out roses"). The admission of the iiiegaiiy obtained fiower wrapping from
Mr. Mecham's car was, therefore, prejudicial. The State also introduced a wallet found
in a door compartment of the passenger's side of the Blazer. R. 458 (p. 141, I. 11-22).
The wallet contained a driver's license for Philip Earl Hollen. R. 458 (p. 141,1. 23 - p.
142,1. 6). The wallet also contained a visitor card for the Million Dollar Saloon, (p. 143,
I. 10-20). Mr. Mecham's driver's license was found in a wallet in the driver's
compartment on the door. R. 458 (p. 142, I. 7-25). Mr. Hollen admitted that he was at
fault in the case. R. 458 (p. 174, I. 7-10). The admission of the wallets together with
the driver's licenses and visitor card further prejudiced Mr. Mecham.
The State's case against Mr. Mecham was based on circumstantial evidence.
The introduction of the evidence from the Blazer tied Mr. Mecham directly to Mr. Hollen
and the roses passed out by the clowns during the robber. Because the affidavit for the
search warrant was facially defective, the evidence acquired during the search should
have been suppressed. The introduction of the illegally seized evidence was unduly
prejudicial, and Mr. Mecham's convictions for Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated
Assault should be reversed.

ARGUMENT III
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THE AFFIANT FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT INTENTIONALLY,
KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY OMITTED INFORMATION, AND, WITH
THE OMITTED INFORMATION INSERTED, THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT
SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE
At trial, it became apparent that certain significant facts known to the affiant for
the search warrant were omitted from the affidavit filed for the search warrant in
violation of Mr. Mecham's rights for a probable cause determination based on fact
under Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution. The omitted facts include: (1) certain unknown law enforcement officers
and persons moved the vehicle, and neither the location the vehicle was originally
found nor the location to which the vehicle w?s moved were disclosed to the magistrate
in the affidavit for the search warrant; (2) certain unknown law enforcement officers and
persons had access to and opportunity to enter into the vehicle to be searched without
acquiring a warrant; and the inherent problem that arises because (3) no reports or
records were made by or regarding the unknown law enforcement officers and persons
who had opportunity to or who entered into and in fact moved the vehicle that was
subject of the search.
The affiant officer for the search warrant (R. 195-197) was also the lead
investigating officer in the case R. 195-197, R. 461 (p. 161, I. 16-18). He testified at
trial that he was the individual with the job of reviewing all law enforcement reports
regarding the case, to analyses whether all of the officers who ere at the scene
appropriately filed reports, and to collect the evidence. R. 461 (p. 163,1. 9-24). In the
affidavit for the search warrant he signed, he did not disclose to any degree of accuracy

29

where the vehicle was located when the warrant was sought, he omitted stating that the
vehicle had been or would be moved, and whether the vehicle had been entered or
moved.
Recall that there was a three day iag between the day the robbery occurred and
the date the affidavit for the warrant was sought. R. 458 (p. 183, I. 23 - p. 188, I. 14); R.
195-197. During cross-examination at trial he testified the vehicle had been moved,
and that the search of the vehicle was not conducted at the location where it was
originally found. Moreover, it became apparent that no law enforcement reports or logs
were prepared at all regarding when or how the vehicle got to the place it as searched.
Q [Defense Counsel] At the time that Mr. Mecham's vehicle was
searched, it had been moved; isn't that true?
A. [Detective, Affiant] That's true.
Q.
And it had been moved by a law enforcement officer or
someone associated with law enforcement; isn't that true?
A.

Correct.

Q.
An there isn't a single report at indicating who the person is
that moved Mr. Mecham's vehicle; isn't that true?
A.
No, there was not. It would have been a tow truck that['s]
used for our evidence.
Q.
So a certain unknown person had access to Jeff Mecham's
vehicle after the incident, before the vehicle was searched; isn't that true?
A.
Would have been followed - Normal procedure is that it's
followed by a deputy until it's taken to the evidence yard.
Q.
But there isn't a single report about an officer following the
vehicle; isn't that true?
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A.

That's true.

Q.

And the scene was logged; isn't that true?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Every officer touching anything in the crime scene area is to
file a report with regard to that; isn't that true?
A.

Normally, Yes.

Q.
Every officer removing something from the crime scene is to
file a report indicating they have removed that vehicle or object; isn't that
true?
A.

True.

Q.
And in this case, with Mr. Mecham's vehicle, there is no
report indicating who it was that had any contact with his vehicle from the
time of the event until the time it was searched; isn't that true?
A.

That's true.

Q.
There is no way to know whether or not any person planted
any evidence in Mr. Mecham's vehicle; isn't that true?
A.

Nothing documented to show that, yes.

R. 461 (p. 179,1.20-181 I. 10.)
In Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 LEd.2d 667 (1978), the
United States Supreme Court held that where the defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event
that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the
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defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material
set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable
cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the
same extent as if probabie cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. *d, at 155-56,
&o S Ct. at 2676.
The Utah Supreme Court has extended the reasoning in Franks v. Delaware to
include misstatements which occur because information is omitted. State v. Neilsen.
77.7 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). Under Neilsen. a defendant must establish by a
prep iderance of the evidence that material information has been intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly omitted, and, that with the omitted information inserted, the
affidavit does not support probable cause. l±
l

n the present case, even though the lead investigating officer and other law

enforcement officers knew the vehicle subject to the search had been moved. They
knew, or must have known, when it was moved, who entered the vehicle, where it was
originally found, and where it was searched. Yet, not a single report was written with
regard to anything concerning this critical evidence. There is no information in the
affidavit for the search warrant indicating the actual location of the vehicle or what, if
anything, had been done with the evidence. Defense counsel therefore has the heavy
onus of making a preliminary showing that the affidavit omits critical information known
to law enforcement under Franks v. Delaware and Neilson.
The lack of particularity in affidavit and the absence of any law enforcement
reports regarding the activities of the law enforcement officers and other persons
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involved in securing, logging, entering or moving a vehicle that is the subject of the
search warrant this matter being reviewed for manifest injustice and plain error.
"Manifest injustice" occurs where "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" exist.
See. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276; Irwin. 924 P.2d 5. The standard of review is whether,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1208. It is an exceptional circumstance when law
enforcement is involved with critical evidence to a case and no reports whatever are
made regarding the activities of anyone involved.
Defendant submits that the evidence shows by a preponderance that the actual
location of the vehicle to be searched was intentionally, knowingly or recklessly omitted
from the affidavit. Certainly, a magistrate should be informed with regard to any
changes in the condition of the place to be searched from the original status in which it
was found by law enforcement, especially when those changes are done by or at the
request of law enforcement, in order to evaluation whether probable cause exists and a
warrant should issue. In the present case, the issuing magistrate is mislead by the lack
of information in an affidavit that the affiant knew about, but either intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly omitted. This is one of the grounds for the exclusion of
evidence, for which the good faith exception by the executing officer does not apply
under Leon. 468 U.S. at 922, 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, 3421, 82 LEd.2d 677. No
documentation exists regarding who drove, moved, towed or hauled the vehicle, as well
as no record or log of where the vehicle was originally found, or where it was taken
between the time it was originally found and when it was ultimately searched.
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Therefore, the evidence seized from the vehicle should have been suppressed, and
due to the omissions from the warrant Mr. Mecham's convictions for Aggravated
Robbery and Aggravated Assault should be reversed. In the present case, known facts
have been omitted and because no law enforcement reports regarding the facts exist,
none may be inserted. The court should reverse the convictions, as the evidence
seized during the search should have been excluded at trial.

ARGUMENT IV
SERGEANT JULIAN'S TESTIMONY TO THE JURY, WHICH WAS
MERELY OPINION AND FOR WHICH HE HAD NO ACTUAL PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE, THAT JEFFREY MECHAM WAS IN THE PARKING LOT
AND SHOOTING AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE WAS ERROR PER
SE.
Sergeant Julian never testified from his personal knowledge he could identify Mr.
Mecham as the second individual. In fact, he testified on cross-examination that he
never saw the second individual's face. R. 459 (p. 160, I. 3-18). Sergeant Julian was
the first witness for the State to testify regarding Mr. Mecham, and as to any facts,
direct or circumstantial, that associate him with the offense. The State offered no
witness who was either inside the Million Dollar Saloon or known to have been involved
in the gun fire in the parking lot who could identify Mr. Mecham as the second
individual.
Sergeant Julian's statements invaded the province of the jury, thereby violating
his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and under Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution, in that the officer testified to
34

his guilt without foundation or knowledge and deprived him of having a j i ' make the
decisions as to whether he was guilty of an offense. Sergeant Julian's statements more
particularly violated Mr. Mecham's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution which grant the accused the
right to a trial by jury, as the statements invaded the province of the jury on the ultimate
issue of fact as to whether Mr. Mecham was guilty.
On two occasions Sergeant Julian made inappropriate statements during
^stimony, stating that Mr. Mecham was the other individual, once when he said, "Mr.
Mecham was shooting." and again when he said, "my attention went to Mr. Mecham."
R. 459 (p. 133,1. 16-17; p. 140, I. 2-3). The both times and objection was made, the
second time it happened a motion for a mistrial was made and denied. R. 459 (133133, 151-156).
Sergeant Julian lacked personal knowledge as to whether Mr. Mecham was
shooting or in the parking lot. Pursuant to Rule 602, U.R.E, a witness may not testify to
a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness
has personal knowledge of the matter. Twice Sergeant Julian testified that Mr. Mecham
was the individual he saw; yet the evidence clearly shows that Sergeant Julian did not
base this on his own personal knowledge of the matter.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated it quite directly.
Rule 602 is not amenable to such a broad construction. It merely
requires that the witness have the opportunity and the capacity to
perceive the events in question. See State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d 39, 42
(Utah 1987); Utah R.Evid. 602; Fed.R.Evid. 602 advisory committee's
note; J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence U 602[02] (1987).
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State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct.
62, 107 LEd.2d 29 (1989). Sergeant did not have the opportunity to see who the
second individual was, and should never have said it was Mr. Mecham.
T' -re does not appear to be a Utah case wherein the Court has as addressed a
law enforcement officer testifying as to the guilt of an accused. The Wyoming Supreme
Court has addressed the issue on several occasions, and has reversed convictions as
"per se" error.
In a rape case where the credibility of the victim was at issue, a Deputy Sheriff
testified in response to a question of what he did during his initial contact with the
victim, "I made the determination that she had been raped..." In Whiteplume v. State.
841 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Wyo. 1992). No objection or motion to strike was made in the
Whiteplume case, and the appeal was taken on grounds that the officer's statement
was per se error, i d The Whiteplume court noted that the Deputy Sheriff was an
experienced law enforcement officer and presumed he was experienced with testifying
in court, j d at 1339. The court questioned whether the Deputy actually made the rape
determination at that point, not knowing point how extensive the investigation would be.
Id. The Court concluded that an experienced officer would not have made a rape
determination so early in the investigation process. \± Basically, the Wyoming Court
concluded the Deputy lacked personal knowledge as to whether a rape had occurred.
The Wyoming Court further noted that an experienced officer would have known he
could express his opinion as to whether a rape occurred if the precise question were
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asked of him. \± The Court noted that there was no proof as to whether the Deputy
deliberately injected his opinion into his testimony, and that it appeared the statement
was inadvertent. M, However, the Court pointed out it was "... unable to know with
certainty what was in his mind or heart when he uttered those words." jd.
In addition to the above foregoing factors, the Whiteplume Court also took into
account the universally recognized trial practice dynamics. \± at 1340. The Court
noted the Deputy Sheriff was the prosecution's first witness and that the practicing trial
bar is familiar with the theories of primacy and recency; that, "[the] former theory holds
that the jury tends to remember that which it hears first; the latter theory holds that the
jury also tends to remember that which it hears last." Id,

In the present case,

Sergeant Julian is an experienced law enforcement officer, with eighteen and a half
years of experience. He too can be presumed to be experienced with testifying in
court. Unlike Whiteplume where there might be some question as to whether a rape
determination was made by the Deputy, in the present case Sergeant Julian could not
identify the individual as Mr. Mecham at the time of the event. kL at 1339. Finally,
regardless of whether Sergeant Julian's statement was intentional or not, he would
have known based on his years of experience and rank that he could not express his
opinion about who the individual was without having actual personal knowledge. While
Sergeant Julian's testimony followed the testimony of witnesses who were in the Million
Dollar Saloon; his was the first testimony of any person that made any kind of
identification of the perpetrators in the case. He was the first person to be able to
identify Mr. Hollen at the scene and he positively identified Mr. Hollen in court. The fact
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that he stated at trial Mr. Mecham was also shooting and at the scene was highly
prejudicial under the facts of this case.
In Stephens v. State. 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo.1989) the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that opinion testimony as to the accused's guilt was error per se "because it is
impossible to determine whether the jury may have relied on the expressed opinion in
reaching its verdict." The Court stated that "[T]o permit jurors to rely on a witness's
opinion of the defendant's guilt 'would be the ultimate abdication of the function of the
jury.'" Jd, at 64. The Stephens Court held error per se existed when the prosecutor
expressly asked several witnesses whether they had formed an opinion about the
identity of the person who had sexually molested the victim and to state that opinion,
which each witness then did. i d at 64-67.
Sergeant Julian invaded the province of the jury. He identified Mr. Hollen as one
of the individuals who robbed the Million Dollar Saloon, because he actually saw him,
and then he named Mr. Mecham as also being present on two occasions during his
testimony. Sergeant Julian took over the fact finding duties of the jury, and stated the
conclusion he desired them to reach even though he had no actual knowledge as to the
identity of the second individual whc robbed the saloon. In the clear absence of actual
personal knowledge, Sergeant Julian entered the courtroom and gave his opinion as if
it were fact, by telling the jury Mr. Mecham was guilty. This abdication of the jury
process is a violation of Due Process and invaded the jury's fact finding mission. When
a law enforcement officer engages in such conduct, as seen here, trial courts should
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find there has been a mistrial and appellate courts should not let the convictions stand.
Mr. Mecham's convictions in the present case should be reversed.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
There was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. Mecham, or another
party to the offense, "took personal propertv in the possession of the million do' ax
saloon from the person or immediate presence of the manager" as charged in the
information and stated in the jury instructions. Mr. Mechan's Aggravated Robbery
conviction is not supported by the evidence presented at trial, and should be reversed.
The affidavit for the search warrant for the search of the Chevrolet Blazer wholly
.dcked indicia of probable cause and was so facially deficient that the evidence seized
should have been suppressed at trial. The court should reverse Mr. Mecham's
convictions for Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Assault, as the evidence seized
during the search should have been excluded at trial.
The affiant for the search warrant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly omitted
information, and, with the omitted information inserted, the affidavit does not support
probable cause. In the present case, known facts have been omitted and because no
law enforcement reports regarding the facts exist, none may be inserted. The court
should reverse Mr. Mecham's convictions for Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated
Assault
Sergeant Julian's testimony to the jury, which was merely opinion and for which
he had no actual personal knowledge, that Jeffrey Mecham was in the parking lot and
shooting at the time of the offense was error per se. Sergeant Julian invaded the
province of the jury. Mr. Mecham's rights to Due Process and a Jury Trial were
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violated, requiring that Mr. Mecham's convictions for Aggravated Robbery and
Aggravated Assault be revetted.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues are Significant and warrant
the same.

sh

Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ d a y o f c j 3 * ? < r i 9 % ^ ~

Edwin S. Wall
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions. Statutes. Rules or Regulations

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure In their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shali issue, but upon probaibe cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
the searched, and the person or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining wintesses in his favor, and have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abride the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7
No person shal be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the wintesses against him, to have ompulsory
process to compel the attendance of wintesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trail by an impartiol jury of the county or district in which
theoffesne is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the funciton of that examination is limited to determining
whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constituiton shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whoe or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if apropriate discovery is allowed
as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
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STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1)(a),
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Robbery
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 761-601;
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(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203. Conditions precedent to issuance of a Search
Warrant
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be searched
and the person, property, or evidence to be seized.
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable
cause shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to
the alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding
by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by
subpoena, or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that
reasonably afford protection of the following interests of the person or entity in
possession of such evidence:
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business;
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential
sources of information; or
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally protected
rights.
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RULES

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 602. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the
witness1 own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 4. PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC
OFFENSES
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any
time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.

ADDENDUM A -

PAGE 5

ADDENDUM B
List of Parts of the Record (Alphabetically)

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
WALTER R. ELLETT, 0980
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
MAGISTRATE

450 South 200 East
ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned affiant, Ben Forbes, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff and has reason to believe
That in the vehicle described as a Vehicle #1: 1974 Ford Bronco, color white over blue, license #
826
HSK, Utah, VIN#V15GCT87725, Registered
to Phillip
Hollen.
and/or in the vehicle described as Vehicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white
over blue over white, License #122 HCH, Utah, VIN #1G8EK18C9EF114050.
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, Slate of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Flowers andflowersparts
Masks and/or costume clothing
Flex - cuff tics
Weapons and/or ammunition
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and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, and
has been used lo commit or conceal a public offense, and
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a
public offense, and
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct.

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of
Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Kidnapping and attempted homicide.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your affiant is conducting an investigation into an incident occurring on September 24,
1995 at about 2:30 A.M. at a business known as the Million Dollar Saloon at 3420 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At that place and time two male persons entered the establishment disguised in masks and
clown costumes throwing flowers at the employees and patrons in the building. The two
suspects then displayed hand guns and advised that a robbery was taking place and demanded
money. Using flex-cuff ties they had an employee tie the hands of several persons in the
establishment.
While attempting to place money in a bag the suspects became aware of the presence of
Sheriffs Deputies in the parking lot of the business.
The suspects attempted to flee and engaged the deputies in a gun battle wherein one
deputy was wounded in the arm and a business patron was wounded in the buttocks.
The suspects were apprehended and identified as Phillip Hollen and Jeffrey Mecham.
A search of the surrounding area located the described vehicles in the area of the
business.
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Your affiant based upon his experience as a Deputy Sheriff, believes that each vehicle
may contain evidence of the crimes being investigated and that a search warrant should be issued
to allow the search of each vehicle.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items:

Ben Forbes
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this^g^jtey of September, 1995.

NOTAllY FUliLi«
LINDA L. MORGAN
9M East 400 Soum
My Commission Exp""
CTATE OF UTAH.

./>•*

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNIE W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: E. Jones
Assigned to: E. Jones

Plaintiff,
-vs-

BAIL: Def 1 No Bail
Def2NoBail

JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM DOB 04/24/71,
Warrant/ReleaseDef 1: Release to U.S.P.
AKA NONE
Warrant/Release Def 2: Prison
OTN 07608946
PHILIP EARL HOLLEN DOB 01/23/62,
AKA NONE
OTN
Defendant.

INFORMATION

Case No. }}$1

£> /

°J

fy)

The undersigned Detective Forbes - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 24, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL HOLLEN, as parties to the offense,
unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the possession of Million Dollar
Saloon from the person or immediate presence of the manager of Million Dollar Saloon,
and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to the manager of Million Dollar Saloon;
further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a firearm was

^
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used in the commission or firtherance of the Aggravated I obbery, giving rise to
enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

:GUNT II
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at
3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 24,
1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendants, JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL
HOLLEN, as parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the
death of Mike Julian, a peace officer who was trying to make a lawful arrest and while
defendants were engaged in the commission of Aggravated Robbery.
COUNT III
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at
3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 24,
1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendants, JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL
HOLLEN, as parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the
death of Ken Frank, a peace officer who was trying to make a lawful arrest and while
defendants were engaged in the commission of Aggravated Robbery.
COUNT IV
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 24, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL HOLLEN, as parties to the offense,
did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of the
Walter Finley, seize, with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted commission
of a felony, or flight from a felony.
COUNT V
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 24, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL HOLLEN, as parties to the offense,
did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of the
Linda Peterson, seize, with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony.
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COUNT VI
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 24, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL HOLLER as parties to the offense,
did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of the
W >de York, seize, with the intent to facilitate the* commission or attempted commission
of a felony, or flight from a felony.
COUNT VII
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 3420 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 24, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and PHILIP EARL HOLLEN, as parties to the offense,
did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of the
Craig Sunderlin, seize, with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony.
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM is currently on Parole
from the Utah State Prison for another felony. Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge.
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant PHILIP EARL HOLLEN is currently on Parole from the
Jtah State Prison for another felony. Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Sgt. Julian, Ken Frank, Deputy Broadhead, Deputy Wooten, Deputy Arnn, Detective
Forbes, Deputy McMahon, Douglas Hagmond, Scott Wamsley, Randi Seals, Jamie Kjar,
Cindy Neale, Linda J. Peterson, Megan Lewis, Christopher Stanley, Kellie A. Davidson,
Kathleen
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PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant based this information on police report 95-130729.
On September 29, 1995, two men dressed in clown outfits, entered the Million Dollar
Saloon with guns and attempted to take money from the manger. The suspects tied up four
employees.
Officer Mike Julian was shot in the left arm by one of the suspects as he attempted to
apprehend the suspects.
The two men also fired shots at Officer Ken Frank as he responded to the robbery.
Phillip Hollen was apprehended in the parking lot by Officer Julian. Mr. Hollen admitted
to Officer Keith Stephens that he was involved.
Jeffrey Mecham was apprehended by Officer Wooten hiding in a dumpster about a block
from the Saloon. Mecham was still wearing white gloves from the clown outfit.
Mr. Mecham owned a Blazer which was located in the parking lot of the Million Dollar
Saloon. Phil Hollis' wallet was found inside the Blazer.

DETECTIVE FORBES
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of October, 1995.

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON^strict Attorney

v
jrpiJu*
Deputy District Attorney
r

/
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cae/95012749
Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Defendant No. 1
Prior related cases : Salt Lake Circuit Court-DAO #95013184
Officer's Badge No. P53D
Agency Case Number: 95-130729
An-est Date: 09/24/95
Ja Booking Number: 9520281
Defendant's Sex : Male
Defendant's Social Security Number: 529-51-0389
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 149115291
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Ut
Defendant No. 2
Prior related cases : Salt Lake Circuit Court-DAO #95013184
Officer's Badge No. P53D
Agency Case Number: 95-130729
Arrest Date: na
Jail Booking Number: NA
Defendant's Sex : Male
Defendant's Social Security Number: 387-78-9187
Defendant's Driver's License Number: Unknown
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: na

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,
Case No._
Count No._
Honorable.
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.
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Mr

i&jer,
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• The motion of.
. to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Q a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty;
• plea ofno contest; of the offense of
fic$£yra\/aTgA
Kniohpisy
, a felony
w>
of the t^**
degree,
Q
a
cla^s
misdemeanor,
being
now
present
in
court
and
ready
for
sentence
and
i
u
class
_ , and the State being represented by^» S\pOv\p}As now adjudged guilty
represented by
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

•
•
Q

?
•
a
a

?

Q

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to.
such sentence is to run concurrently
vsv/i I V / U I i ^ i m y with
Willi
such sentence is to run nonserntivftlywith^ouAXT 3 eA4hi.i\r/lAa.~1r
upon motion of Q State
e, Q Defense, • Court, Court(s)

I

SPAA^ej^XoA

I

»

\*£LUA£\

.

are hereby dismissed. <$£AUed

Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions^ probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County M for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue - r o C - H v u J ) i + v v J
DATED this.

8

day of.

DfL&mXA ,19 9 J

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
/

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Page
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c:

ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
3ased upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty;
Judge's
initials

%*£-

and it is ordered that the^fefendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a
term Dof one year, or K n o t to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above.

D

HABITUAL C R I M I N A L ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sentenced to:
not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.

DATED this

ft>

day of

l^£AM,W/\

, 19 3-3
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IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,
Case No._
Count No._
Honorable.
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

m

k^+-ky
\/t

C^<fievbppaS

Ae^a

UPC

IS.
Ui-LVWins

1

ik.

q^-7

• The motion of.
. to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly in Q granted • denied. There being nef legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convipted by la a jury; Q the court, • plea of guilty;
As^CX\J\\
• plea of ho contest; of the offense of.
a felony
of the 3 ^ degree, Q a class
misdemeanor, being now present
pre
and ready for sentence and
in
lgQl\eNpis now adjudged guilty
represented by cZo L M A . 1 \
, and the State being represented by1
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

a

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
.to.

•

such sentence is to run
with
such sentence is to run cnnrfroutiuoly with
upon motion of Q State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s)

•

•
•
•

a

ttzfcf

.are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of above ( Q prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County 3 ' r o r delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
TOr^kuMlv\#
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney

Page
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\ ft

Before you can convict the defendant, JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM,
of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count I of the
Information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1995, in

S-.lt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, JEFFERY DEVON
MECHAM, as a party to the offense, took personal property then in
the possession of Million Dollar Saloon, from the person or
immediate presence of Christopher Stanley; and
2.

That such taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking was against the will of Christopher

Stanley; and
5.

That such taking was accomplished by means of force or

fear; and
6.

That

in

the

course

of

committing

such

taking,

a

dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged
in Count I of the Information.

If, on the other hand, you are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of Count I.

Edwin S. Wall, Utah Bar No. 7446
WALL & CONSTANTINO, L.C.
68 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445
Attorney for the Defendant

Q&vlo—'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DEPARTMENT I
STATE OF UTAH,
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
> WRONGFULLY SEIZED

Plaintiff,
v•
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and
PHILIP EARL HOLLEN,

)

Case No. s e i ^ H S F S

)

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Jeffery D. Mecham, by and through his
attorney Edwin S. Wall, and submits his memorandum in support of
his Motion to Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized due to a lack of
probable cause to issue the search warrant.

FACTS
On September 27, 1995 Ben Forbes, a Deputy Salt Lake County
Sheriff, signed an affidavit

for a search warrant.

In the

affidavit he sought various items from a vehicle described in its
entirety as follows:

Vehicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white over
blue over white, License
#122 HCH, Utah, VIN
#1G8EK18C9EF114050 .

With respect to the vehicle, the only other fact alleged is:
A search of the surrounding area located the described
vehicles in the area of the business [referring to the
Million Dollar Saloon].
The

search warrant

affidavit, warrant

and

return

attached

as

exhibits nAff, "B", and "C" respectively, and incorporated herein by
this reference.

The evidence seized includes:

(2) Wallets,
(1) Set of keys,
(1) Sugar House Flower Patch clear wrapping paper, and
(1) Rose leaf.

LAW
The standard for the issuance of a search warrant is whether
a magistrate has a substantial basis

to conclude

that

in the

totality of the circumstances, the affidavit adequately establishes
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987)

State v.

(citing, United States v.

Ancrulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. Dist. Or. 1986)).

Affidavits

used to obtain a search warrant are to be construed in a commonsense, reasonable manner.
(Utah

1983).

Thus,

State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132, 133
Utah

follows

the

"totality-of-the-

circumstances" test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Vigh,
871 P.2d

1030, 1033

(Utah App. 1994) (and cases cited therein).

Under this standard, probable cause is determined by making a
practical common-sense decision, given all the circumstances set
2

forth

in

the

affidavit,

including

the

veracity

and

basis

of

knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332;

Vigh, 871 P.2d 1033.
Courts, reviewing

the probable

cause determination of the

magistrate, determine if a substantial basis for concluding there
were e.iough facts within the affidavit
existed."

to find probable

cause

Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1033; State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884,

885 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

This is

done by viewing the affidavit in its entirety.

Vigh, 871 P. 2d at

1033;

(Utah 1985).

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102

See

also. State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(Utah App. 1993) .
The law provides that evidence obtained by officers acting in
good faith, objectively and reasonably relying on search warrant
issued by neutral and detached magistrate need not be excluded even
if warrant is subsequently invalidated by lack of probable cause.
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
App. 1993).

However, there are four circumstances where the good

faith exception does not apply.

Id.

The four circumstances in which the exclusionary rule applies,
and good faith cannot be found are:
(1)

(2)

the issuing magistrate is mislead by information in an
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard of the
truth;
the issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role
and fails to perform his neutral and detached function;
3

(3)

(4)

United

the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
its existence entirely unreasonable;
the warrant is so facially deficient that it failed
particularize the place to be searched or the things
be seized, that the executing officer cannot presume
to be valid.

States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 923, 104 S.Ct.

3420, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d

677

(1984).

in
in
to
to
it

3405,

The analysis below shows the

exclusionary rule should apply, at least on the grounds that

"the

warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable
cause

as

to

render

official

belief

in

its

existence

entirely

unreasonable."

ANALYSIS
The affidavit
could

conclude

search warrant.

fails to allege any facts from which a

probable

cause

existed

for

the

issuance

court

of

the

The affidavit simply states that law enforcement

found a vehicle in the "surrounding area" where a robbery occurred
and want to search it for evidence.
issuance of a warrant
cause

standard.

This is not sufficient for the

under any standard, much less a

To find otherwise would permit

probable

law enforcement

could search any and all vehicles located within several blocks of
a crime scene in every case.
The factual basis alleged in the affidavit is defective in the
following specific respects:

(1) Nothing in the affidavit indicates the vehicle was in any
manner associated with, tied to, owned by, registered to or
otherwise connected with the crime or any suspect;

4

(2) Nothing in the affidavit indicates the scope or size of
the term "surrounding area," the mere presence of a vehicle
near a crime scene is not sufficient to tie the vehicle to the
crime or persons suspected to have committed the crime;
(3) The affidavit does not indicate that anything in, on, or
about the vehicle, from plain view or otherwise, connected it
with the crime or any suspect;
(4) Nothing in the affidavit indicates the time of initial or
following observations of the vehicle by law enforcement or
any other person which would provide any temporal proximity,
association, or connection with the crime or any suspect;
(5) The affidavit does state that fIII[t]he suspects
attempted to flee," but nothing in the affidavit or the
discovery provided to defense counsel indicates that the
vehicle was in any manner associated with, part of, or
involved with any aspect of the attempt to flee.
(6) The body of the Search Warrant indicates that the 1984
Chevrolet Blazer is "Registered to Jeffery Mecham," however,
that fact is not and cannot be found or inferred, directly or
indirectly, from any one or more facts found within the body
of the affidavit.
The

search

warrant

for the

1984

Chevrolet

Blazer

issued

without any basis whatever in the supporting affidavit. Therefore,
the evidence found pursuant to the warrant was illegally obtained
and should be excluded.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant prays the court will exclude any and all evidence
allegedly found in the 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer.

DATED this

y

day o f > ^ f y > > ^ 199^?
WALL 6c CONSTANTINO, L.C.

Edwin S. Wall,
Attorney for the Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
^s%,
Edjyan S. Wall, hereby certify that on the p/
day of
^^O^^^^l^/ 199-^ I served a copy of the attached Memorandum
in Support of Motion to
Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized by
mailing the same, first class, postage prepaid to:
Richard S. Shepherd
Nicholas M. D'Alesandro
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
WALL 8c CONSTANTINO, L.C.

Edwin S. Wall,
Attorney for the Defendant
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EXHIBIT A

Search Warrant

Affidavit

•/if I

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
WALTER R. ELLETT, 0980
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
MAGISTRATE

450 South 200 East
ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned affiant, Ben Forbes, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff and has reason to believe
That in the vehicle described as a Vehicle #1: 1974 Ford Bronco, color white over blue, license #
826
HSK,
Utah,
VIN#V15GCT87725,
Registered
to
Phillip
Hollen.
and/or in the vehicle described as Vehicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white
over blue over white, License #122 HCH, Utah, VIN #1G8EK18C9EF114050.
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Flowers and flowers parts
Masks and/or costume clothing
Flex-cuff ties
Weapons and/or ammunition

PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, and
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, and
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a
public offense, and
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct.

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of
Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Kidnapping and attempted homicide.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your affiant is conducting an investigation into an incident occurring on September 24,
1995 at about 2:30 A.M. at a business known as the Million Dollar Saloon at 3420 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At that place and time two male persons entered the establishment disguised in masks and
clown costumes throwing flowers at the employees and patrons in the building. The two
suspects then displayed hand guns and advised that a robbery was taking place and demanded
money. Using flex-cuff ties they had an employee tie the hands of several persons in the
establishment.
While attempting to place money in a bag the suspects became aware of the presence of
Sheriffs Deputies in the parking lot of the business.
The suspects attempted to flee and engaged the deputies in a gun battle wherein one
deputy was wounded in the arm and a business patron was wounded in the buttocks.
The suspects were apprehended and identified as Phillip Hollen and Jeffrey Mecham.
A search of the surrounding area located the described vehicles in the area of the
business.

PAGE 3
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

Your affiant based upon his experience as a Deputy Sheriff, believes that each vehicle
may contain evidence of the crimes being investigated and that a search warrant should be issued
to allow the search of each vehicle.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items:

Ben Forbes
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thls^Z-^Y

Th- of September, 1995

LINDA L. MORGAtl
o«*i Past 400 South

(

MyComm»«onExp,ce S
February 1 t . 1 9 y o
STATE OF U T A H

./)rf

EXHIBIT B
Search

Warrant

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
No.

:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Ben Forbes, I am satisfied
that there is probable cause to believe that in the vehicle described as a Vehicle #1: 1974 Ford
Bronco, color white over blue, license # 826 HSK, Utah, VIN#V15GCT87725, Registered to
Phillip Hollen and/or in the vehicle described as Veliicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color
white over blue over white, License #122 HCH, Utah, Vin #1G8EK18C9EF114050, Registered
to Jeffrey Mecham.

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Flowers and flowers parts
Masks and/or costume clothing
Flex - cuff ties
Weapons and/or ammunition

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a
public offense, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a part}' to
the illegal conduct.

PAGE 2
SEARCH WARRANT

You are therefore commanded to make a search of the above-named or described vehicle(s) for
the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to
bring it forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or
retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.

GIVEN UNDER M Y HAND and dated this l/l

day of September, 1995.

/> r\ &

EXHIBIT C

Search

Warrant

Return

r\ -.

RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT
NO.
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was taken
from the vehicle described as a Vehicle #1: 1974 Ford Bronco, color white over blue, license #
826 HSK, Utah, VIN #V15GCT87725, Registered to Phillip Hollen and/or Vehicle #2: 1984
Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color white over blue over white, License #122 HCH, Utah, VIN
#1G8EK189C9EF114050, Registered to Jeffrey Mecham.

by virtue of a search warrant dated the J ? 7
?b7£pN£+s //£MP&/£>

day of September, 1995, and issued by Magistrate

of the above-entitled court.

I, Ben Forbes, by whom this warrant was executed, do swear that the above listed or
below attached inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me
under the warrant, on t h e ^ 9

day of ^>6/>TB^f/^£/P

1995.

All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the
property, or things taken, is triable.

BEN FORBES

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of _

1995.

^??%gq ^

. .

j

MAGISTRATE

/•>

- / •

INVENTORY FOR SEARCH WARRANT
NO.

From 1984 Chevrolet Blazer:
(2) Wallets
(1) Set of keys
(1) Sugar House Flower Patch clear wrapping paper
(1) Rose leaf

From 1974 Ford Bronco:
(1) Blue note book
(1) Yellow piece of paper

Det. Ben Forbes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

: MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

: CASE NO. 961901115

vs.

:

JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM,

:

Defendant.

:

Before the Court are two Motions brought by defendant in this
matter.

The first is defendants Motion to Exclude Evidence

Wrongfully Seized.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed

in this matter and having further heard argument of counsel, now
enters the following ruling.
The defendants Motion is denied.

The defendant argues that

the Affidavit was insufficient in terms of connecting the vehicle
with this particular defendant and in providing a location of the
vehicle.

As to the location of the vehicle, the Court notes that

the Affidavit contains the name of the business and its address,
which was the place where the alleged crimes occurred.

It further

provides information as to where the defendants were running at the
time they left the business and, in addition, provides information
that the vehicle was in that area.

It appears that there was

sufficient information set forth in the Affidavit to allow the

STATE V. MECHAM

MINUTE ENTRY
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officer performing the search to ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched.

Further, while the Affidavit does not

include defendant's name in the description of the vehicle to be
searched, that name was included in the warrant itself and appears
to have been omitted through clerical error in the Affidavit.

The

magistrate had before him, at the time he executed the search
warrant, both the Affidavit and the warrant

itself.

He was

entitled to review all of the documents in their entirety to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to support the
search of the vehicle.
In considering the information provided in both documents, the
undersigned concludes that the magistrate did have sufficient
identifying information to provide the required probable cause.
Based upon the above, the Court denies the defendant's Motion to
Exclude the Evidence Seized as a result of the search warrant.
Defendant's second Motion is a Motion to Suppress certain
statements made by defendant after the incident.

Based upon a

review of the pleadings in this matter, as well as arguments of
counsel, the Court denies the defendant's Motion. The defendant's
statements were spontaneous and voluntary, and were not the product
of any coercion or questioning in any manner by police officers.

STATE V. MECHAM
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MINUTE ENTRY

Based upon the testimony provided to the Court, the Court
finds that defendant Mecham was kicked by police officers and
sprayed with mace following a difficult and tense capture of
Mecham,

He

was,

however,

not

seriously

injured

and

all

participants described the events as occurring quickly.
Pursuant to the testimony of medical providers, the defendant
had only minor injuries, including an eye irritation from the mace,
superficial contusions, and bruises, as well as some tenderness on
his chest wall.

There was no evidence of any head injury.

Dr.

Schiozawa testified that the defendant was alert and appeared to
understand questions put to him and treatment provided by medical
staff.

The Doctor further testified that police officers did not

interfere during that process.

He also testified there was no

evidence of any significant injury either to defendants head or to
his internal organs, and no bones were broken.

Although the

defendant testified that immediately following the incident he was
dizzy, none of the medical evidence or observations support his
testimony.
Based upon all of the testimony, the Court finds that this
defendant had minor injuries, no injuries to his head or brain, was
alert, and understood what was occurring during the course of his
medical treatment, and that he was not unconscious.

As to

STATE V. MECHAM
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pain medication, it appears that the only medication provided to
this defendant was a topical anesthetic agent for his eye.

No

other pain medication was given to him during the course of his
medical treatment.
The Court further finds, based upon the testimony of the
witnesses, that at no time was this defendant questioned by police
officers who accompanied him to the hospital facility.
The Court

further

finds that

although

there was police

misconduct at the time of this defendant's arrest in the manner of
kicking defendant, that there was a significant break in time
between that misconduct and the statements made by defendant.

The

seizure of defendant by police officers occurred shortly after 2:00
a.m.

The first statement defendant made at the hospital occurred

at approximately 3:00 a.m., with the second statement after that
time.
Considering

all of the testimony

heard

in this matter,

although the defendant was mistreated by police officers at the
scene of his arrest, he suffered only minor injuries for which he
received medical treatment.

During the course of his medical

treatment, there was no questioning or other actions taken by
police officers to coerce or produce any statements from this
defendant.

Defendant's statements made well after the time of his

STATE V. MECHAM
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mistreatment were spontaneous and voluntary, and not the product of
police coercion.
In addition to that, although the defendant appeared to be
relaxed and possibly sleeping prior to the time that he made his
statements, there is no evidence that he was unconscious, that he
suffered any head injury, or that he suffered any medical condition
beyond being tired.
Based upon all of the above, the Court denies the Motion to
Suppress the defendants statements.
Dated this '^

SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

- j
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
1997:

Richard S. Shepherd
Nicholas M. D'Alesandro
Deputy District Attorneys
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edwin S. Wall
Attorney for Defendant
68 S. Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

\^\

day of May,

Edwin S. Wall, Utah Bar No. 7446
WALL & CONSTANTINO, L.C.
68 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445
Attorney for the Defendant

-- ,L

Or,
'OZJIO^-L^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DEPARTMENT I
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
WRONGFULLY SEIZED

v.

case NO. geigdiisFS
JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM and
PHILIP EARL HOLLEN,
Judge Sandra N. Peuler
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Jeffery D. Mecham, by and through
his attorney Edwin S. Wall, and moves the court exclude evidence
seized from the 1984 Chevrolet Blazer and such evidence was
seized pursuant to a search warrant which issued illegally, to
wit: (2) Wallets, (1) Set of keys, (1) Sugar House Flower Patch
clear wrapping paper, and (1) Rose leaf. State v. Hansen, 732
P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238,
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Viah, 871
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
DATED this

j/^day of s^L<^,

199£.

WALL Sc CONSTANTINO, L.C.

Edwin S. Wall,
Attorney for the Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
in S. Wall, hereby certify that on the </
day of
, 1 9 9 ^ I served a copy of the attached Motion to
Exclude Evidence Wrongfully Seized by mailing the same, first
class, postage prepaid to:
Richard S. Shepherd
Nicholas M. D'Alesandro
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
WALL 8c CONSTANTINO, L.C.

Edwin S. Wall,
Attorney for the Defendant

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
No.

:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Ben Forbes, I am satisfied
that there is probable cause to believe that in the vehicle described as a Vehicle #1: 1974 Ford
Bronco, color white over blue, license # 826 HSK, Utah, VIN#VI5GCT87725, Registered to
Phillip Hollen and/or in the vehicle described as Veliicle #2: 1984 Chevrolet K-10 Blazer, color
white over blue over white, License #122 HCH, Utah, Vin #1G8EK18C9EF114050, Registered
to Jeffrey Mecham.

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Flowers and flowers parts
Masks and/or costume clothing
Flex-cuff ties
Weapons and/or ammunition

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a
public offense, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a part}' to
the illegal conduct.
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SEARCH WARRANT
You are therefore commanded to make a search of the above-named or described vehicle(s) for
the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to
bring it forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or
retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 7/1 day of September, 1995.
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